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MARXISM, SOCIAL METABOLISM, AND ECOLOGICALLY 
UNEQUAL EXCHANGE (draft 30/8/03) 




Authors working on “industrial metabolism” (Ayres, 1989) or “social metabolism” 
(Fischer-Kowalski, 1998, Haberl, 2001) look at the economy in terms of flows of 
energy and materials. Together with the ecological economists, they see  the 
economy as a subsystem of a larger physical system. Is this perspective to be found 
already in Marx and Engels? Marx (1818-1883) and Engels (1820-1895) were 
contemporaries of the physicists and physiologists who established the First and 
Second Laws of Thermodynamics in the 1840s and early 1850s (J.R. Mayer,  1814-
78, J.P. Joule, 1818-89, R. Clausius, 1822-88, W. Thomson, later Lord Kelvin, 
1824-1907).  Marx and Engels followed with a few years’ delay many of the 
remarkable scientific and technical novelties of their time. Engels wrote in 1888 
that the 19th century would be remembered not only as the century of the theory 
of evolution but also of the theory of the transformation of energy, the century of 
Darwin, Mayer, Joule and Clausius (letter to Nikolai Danielson, 15 Oct. 1888).  
 
However, Marx and Engels did not consider the relations between their analytical 
concepts (productive forces, surplus value, exploitation) and the language of 
energy as they could have done in their mature work after the 1850s. For instance, 
they never said that the productivity of labour in agriculture and in industry 
would depend on the energy subsidy to the economic process. Engels’ comments on 
Podolinsky’s work of 1880 on agricultural energetics was a missed chance for an 
ecological Marxism. After all, Marx and Engels were not yet environmental 
historians, ecological economists or industrial ecologists.  Increases in productivity 
depended on the development of the productive forces (Produktivkräfte), where 
“Kraft” (force) was not used with the physical meaning of “energy”. The 
productive forces could be furthered or could be fettered by the “social relations of 
production”. Capitalism had meant an enormous development of the productive 
forces but it provoked economic crises by its very nature, i.e. the exploitation of 
wage labour. Malthusian crises of subsistances were not relevant. The conflict 
between capital and labour would lead to a change in the mode of production. 
These were essential points of their theory.  
 
From the point of view of “social metabolism”, the issue of finding markets for the 
potential production is less relevant than capitalist advance into commodity 
frontiers and its use of overflowing sinks for waste. Capital accumulation is based 
on the exploitation of labour but it can also be described in non-equivalent physical 
language (Frank, 1959, Hornborg, 1998, a and b). Capital has proven unable to 
grow by itself, by its own exploitation of labour and technical change. The 
capitalist economy uses more materials and energy, therefore it produces more 
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of livelihood and existence of peripheral  peoples, who complain accordingly.  Such 
ecological distribution conflicts are more and more visible. They cannot be 
subsumed under the conflict between capital and labour. They are not be seen 
either (in neoclassical language) as “externalities” arising from “market failure”. 
On the contrary, to use Kapp’s words, they are “cost-shifting successes”. And, 
since they are happening with greater intensity, they cannot be seen as 
consequences of the “original” or “primitive” capital accumulation. What Marx 
described as “original accumulation” (such as plunder of America after the 
European conquest, enclosure of the commons in Britain) is going on around the 
world on an increasing scale. Ecological distribution conflicts (James O’Connor’s 
“second contradiction of capitalism”, 1988) keep increasing across the world, with 
a variety of social actors and languages.  
 
Ecological distribution conflicts were not included in Marx’s analysis. They are 
growing with the increasing demand for energy and materials, and with the 
geographical displacement of environmental impacts from North to South. Work 
on social metabolism has advanced to the point where statistics showing the Direct 
Material Requirements of the economy, and the Total Material Requirements 
(separating domestic and external effects), are now being published by statistical 
offices in the European Union (Weisz et al, 2002). They show that in the rich 
countries the economy is not becoming dematerialized in per capita terms, and 
that the share of imports is growing.  Therefore, issues related to unequal trade 
and to the “carbon debt” are becoming more relevant. Unequal exchange had 
already been pointed out in terms of undervaluation of labour and health of the 
poor and of deterioration of the terms of trade expressed in prices. “Social 
metabolic” interpretations of ecologically unequal trade will be discussed, such as 
Hornborg’s view that market prices are the means to increase the flow of energy 
(exergy) from South to North. The distinction in world systems theory between 
trade in “preciosities” vs. trade in bulk commodities will be considered. High 




The first volume of Capital was published in 1867. There were certainly precursors 
of a bio-physical approach to the economy. At least one of them was close to 
Marxism (S. A. Podolinsky, 1850-91). These proto-ecological economists did not 
form a school (Cleveland, 1987, Martinez-Alier with Schlüpmann, 1987). One 
hundred years later, in the 1970s, the study of the human society and economy 
from a physical point of view (flows of materials and energy) started to be 
practiced by coherent research groups. Histories of the use of energy in the 
economy are not connected to Marxism (even when their authors might have 
Marxist pasts) (Cipolla,1962, Sieferle, 1982, Debeir, Deléage, Hémery,1986, Hall, 
Cleveland, Kaufman, 1986, McNeill, 2000). The notion of energy return on energy 
input (EROI) was applied in the 1970s to the economy by Charles Hall and other 
ecologists with no relation to Marxism. Recent explanations of growth in terms of 
the use of energy in the economy (or rather “physical work output as distinguished 
from energy (exergy))”, criticize neoclassical production functions and growth 
theory but draw no inspiration from Marxism (Ayres, Ayres, and Warr, 2002).  
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Nevertheless, Marx and Engels had a profound interest in the interactions between 
the human economy and the natural environment, particularly as regards 
capitalist agriculture. This was expressed in Marx’s use in his own drafts after 
1857-58 and in Capital, of the notion of “metabolism” (Stoffwechsel) between 
humans and Nature. Marxist use of “metabolism” is well known. Alfred Schmidt 
(1978) was the first author to insist in the role of the concept of Stoffwechsel in 
Marx’s work on the development of  capitalism, noting Moleschott’s and Liebig’s 
influence, noting also its substantive use for the cycling of plant nutrients 
(Schmidt, 1978: 86-9; Martinez-Alier with Shlüpmann, 1987: 220-6). Marx became 
so keen on the concept of metabolism that in a letter to his wife (21 June 1856), he 
nicely wrote that what made him feel like a man was his love for her, and not his 
love for Moleschott’s metabolism or for the proletariat. 
 
Marx and Engels were contemporaries of the physiologist Jacob Moleschott (1822-
93). To the present day,  Marxists call him a “vulgar” materialist (meaning a 
reductionist materialist, in opposition to (distinguished?) historical materialists 
who favour dialectics and co-evolution). However “vulgar”, Moleshott was a main 
figure in the introduction of the concept of metabolism in physiology and in what 
now is called ecology. Materialism was used against the doctrine of vitalism and 
against religion. Moleshott had been dismissed after 1848 from Heidelberg, he 
taught in Zurich and in Rome. A well known professor and editor of a scientific 
journal, he had also been an activist. His book on the theory of human nutrition of 
1850 had the subtitle Für das Volk  (Moleschott, 1850). This was certainly different 
in intent from the studies by other authors on the cost-effective feeding of soldiers, 
industrial workers or slaves (in America). In 1851 he published Physiology of 
Metabolism in Plants and Animals (Moleshott, 1851), one year later,  Der Kreislauf 
des Lebens (The Cycle, Circuit or Circle of Life) (Moleshott, 1852). Engels, in a 
letter to Piotr Lavrov of 1875 discussing Darwinism, summarized the idea of  the 
“cycle of life” in “the fact that the vegetable kingdom supplied oxygen and 
nutriment to the animal kingdom and conversely the animal kingdom supplied 
plants with carbonic acid and manure”. This interplay had been interpreted as 
cooperation in Nature by that trio of “vulgar” materialists (Vogt, Büchner and 
Moleschott, who, incidentally, now were talking loudly about “struggle for 
existence”), and it had been stressed by Liebig. 
 
There is a rediscovery of Marx’s “social metabolism” (Foster, 2000). Marx and 
Engels were one generation younger than the agricultural chemists (Liebig, 1803-
73, Boussingault, 1802-87) who published their researches on the cycles of plant 
nutrients (phosphorous, nitrogen, potassium), influenced by the  threat of 
decreasing agricultural yields and the wholesale imports of  guano after 1840 
mainly from Peru, an essential bulk commodity for agricultural production. About 
11 million tons of guano were exported from Peru (Gootenberg, 1993). The 
analyses of the composition of guano, and also of other manures and fertilizers well 
known to farmers (bones, for instance), laid the foundations for agricultural 
chemistry. Liebig’s name was associated by his own wish to a new future leading 
sector of the economy, the fertilizer industry. It may also be associated to an 
ecological vision. He is recognized as one of the founders of Ecology before the 
name itself was invented (Kormondy, 1965). Politically he developed an argument 
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would not return to the soil. He was in favour of small scale agriculture and 
dispersed settlements. Marx quoted this opinion favourably on several occasions. 
 
Indeed, Marx’s use of Stoffwechsel (metabolism)  in Capital (vol. I) and, before 
that,  in some drafts of the late 1850s was influenced by Liebig, probably by other 
authors, and certainly by Moleshott. Marx used “metabolism” in two senses. First, 
as a biological analogy or metaphor to describe the circulation of commodities. 
Second, more relevantly for the present article, he used the expression 
“metabolism between man and earth”, or “between society and nature” to refer 
specifically to the cycles of plant nutrients, quoting and praising Liebig. Such 
metabolism was broken by an agriculture of spoliation.  
 
Marx found Liebig supremely relevant because he described the natural conditions 
of agricultural fertility and the possibility of development of the productive forces 
by  the fertilizer industry. This was useful for the polemics against Malthus, and 
for the theory of land rent. Foster (2000) has analyzed in depth Marx’s debt to 
Liebig, and has wrongly denied Moleshott’s influence on Marx’s use of 
“metabolism”. Foster does not quote Moleshott’s books of 1851 and 1852 on the 
“circle of life” and on the physiology of metabolism in plants and animals.  
 
So, in conclusion, Marx was a historian and an economist, he was also a student of 
agriculture, and he read on the physiology of plants and animals and on 
agricultural chemistry, adopting the notion of “metabolism” between humans and 
Nature. The material flows between humans and Nature were mobilized by human 
labour, except in very primitive societies that lived from gathering. The 
development of tools by humans was essential for the metabolism. Marx did not 
include the metabolic flow of energy in agriculture and in industry in his analysis, 
so he could not trace a fundamental distinction (as Lotka was to do forty years 
later) between  the use of energy in nutrition (endosomatic) and the use of energy 
by tools (exosomatic). This difference between bio-metabolism and techno-
metabolism is crucial for the understanding of human ecology. We as a species 
have genetic instructions regarding our endosomatic consumption of energy but 
not our exosomatic use of energy, which must be explained by history, politics, 
economics, culture, technology. This is not to be found in Marx. Not only he left 
energy flow aside,  he did not count material flows in detail or even roughly, he 
was not a proto-industrial ecologist. But on the positive side, he did not see the 
economy as a closed system, or Nature as an immutable source of free gifts, as the 
neoclassical economists were to do.  
 
Men were part of Nature, men used Nature’s materials, we could increase its 
produce by the development of the so-called productive forces but we could also 
undermine the natural conditions of production. This was the case with capitalist 
agriculture. Marx wrote: “Capitalist production disturbs the metabolic interaction 
between man and the earth, i.e. it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent 
elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing, hence it hinders the 
operation of the eternal natural conditions for the lasting fertility of the soil… 
Moreover, all progress in capitalist agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of 
robbing  the workers, but of robbing the soil…” (Capital, I).  He added that the 
separation of town and country, caused by latifundist agriculture and by the 
concentration of sources of energy in cities, provoked an “irreparable rift” in the 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
  5
process of social metabolism. The result of this was a squandering of the soil, 
aggravated by trade, undermining the conditions of agricultural production. 
Engels wrote: “As the individual capitalists are engaged in production and 
exchange for the sake of the immediate profit, only the nearest, most immediate 
results must first be taken into account”. In today’s economic parlance, Engels was 
saying that individual capitalists discounted the future and did not include 
externalities in their accounts. He continued: “As long as the individual 
manufacturer or merchant sells a manufactured or purchased commodity with the 
usual coveted profit, he is satisfied and does not concern himself with what 
afterwards becomes of the commodity and its purchasers. The same thing applies 
to the natural effects of the same actions. What cared the Spanish planters in 
Cuba, who burned down forests on the slopes of the mountains and obtained from 
the ashes sufficient fertilizer for one generation of very profitable coffee tress – 
what cared they that the heavy tropical rainfall afterwards washed away the 
unprotected upper stratum of the soil, leaving only the bare rock!” (Dialectics of 
Nature). Engels could have mentioned the destruction of forests in western Cuba 
by the sugar industry after 1830 which was more significant than coffee 
cultivation, but the main point stays. Luxury items such as sugar and coffee 
became bulk staples of trade (in the case of sugar as a source of cheap calories), 
and therefore their environmental “rucksacks” increased.  
 
Such quotations by Marx and Engels could be multiplied, they are not anecdotal, 
they arose (as Foster, 2000, has shown) from a theory of  “metabolic rift”. So, 
Marx was “greener” than usually thought.  However, what Greens can learn in 
Marx is well known to them, i.e.  the cycles of plant nutrients and the damage to 
soil and forests. Green political thought owes more to the science of ecology than to 
Marx. Foster (2000) insists with reason that “metabolic rift” was not equivalent to 
“decreasing returns”. Marx wrote to Engels on 13 February 1866 saying that 
Liebig’s agricultural chemistry was more important for the discussion on 
decreasing returns than all the economists put together. This must be interpreted 
in this sense: the economists talked about decreasing returns in the intensive 
margin but these could be overcome by fertilizers. Actually, Marx dismissed the 
notion of decreasing returns in agriculture altogether, pointing out in the context 
of his praise for Liebig’s agricultural chemistry and its promise of artificial 
fertilizers, that it did not make sense to assume in Britain that the produce of the 
land would increase in a diminishing ratio to the increase of the labourers 
employed, because in practice there was at the time both an increase in production 
and an absolute decrease (already) in the number of labourers (Capital, I, chapter 
13). Marx was not worried about crises of subsistances.  
 
Marxists attacked Malthus, which was well deserved because Malthus had made 
the point that improving the situation of the poor was counterproductive because 
they would have more children. One hundred years after Malthus, around 1900, 
there were many debates on “how many people could the Earth feed” (Pfaundler, 
1902, Cohen, 1995). Some marxists (Lenin, 1913) not only atacked Malthus, they 
also attacked in a sectarian way the Neomalthusians of the late 19
th century and 
early 20
th century who were often political radicals and feminists (Paul Robin, 
Emma Goldman) (Ronsin, 1980, Masjuan, 2000, 2003)   
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Podolinsky’s agricultural energetics  
 
The link between material metabolism (Stoffwechsel, exchanges of materials) and 
the flow of energy at the level of cells and organisms was made in the 1840s. It was 
then also understood that agriculture might be represented in terms of changes in 
the flow of energy and not only as an intervention in the cycling of plants nutrients 
(Mayer, 1845, used Stoffwechsel for energy flow). Metabolism was therefore used  
not only for materials but also for energy. Of course, materials could be cycled, 
energy could not. The theory of the direction of the flow of energy was developed 
after 1850 and the establishment of the Second Law. 
 
Marx and Engels were interested in energy. For instance, Engels wrote to Marx on 
14 July 1858 commenting on Joule’s work on the conservation of energy (of 1840) 
as something well known to them. Marx was interested in new sources of energy. 
One example will suffice: it was already discussed at the time whether hydrogen 
could be a net source of energy, depending on the energy requirement for 
electrolysis. Marx wrote to Engels on 2 April 1866 that a certain M. Rebour had 
found the means of separating the oxygen from hydrogen in water for very little 
expense. However, Marx did not refer to the flow of energy as a part of social 
metabolism throughout his lifetime. At a more general level, one interesting point  
arises from Engels’ unwillingness to understand how the First and Second Laws 
could apply at the same time: the “dialectics of Nature” failed him there. As Engels 
became aware of Clausius’ concept of entropy, he wrote to Marx (21 March 1869): 
“In Germany the conversion of the natural forces, for instance, heat into 
mechanical energy, etc. has given rise to a very absurd theory--- that the world is 
becoming steadily colder... and that, in the end, a moment will come when all life 
will be impossible... I am simply waiting for the moment when the clerics seize 
upon this theory...”. Indeed, not only the clerics but also W. Thomson (Lord 
Kelvin) himself brandished the Second Law in his religious tirades about the “heat 
death” although he could have no inkling of the source of energy in the sun in 
nuclear fusion. One understands Engels’ dislike for the uses to which the Second 
Law was put. Josef Popper-Lynkeus (1838-1921), who with Ernst Mach became 
one source of inspiration for the antimetaphysical philosophy of the Vienna Circle, 
complained since 1876 about W. Thomson’s “theological handling of Carnot’s 
law” (Martinez-Alier with Schlüpmann, 1887: 197). However, Engels’ dislike of the 
Second Law was motivated not only by its religious use or abuse, he believed that it 
would be shown that the heat irradiated to space was not finally dissipated. 
 
Another interesting point is the reaction by Engels in 1882 (in letters to Marx) 
regarding Podolinsky’s work. Podolinsky had studied, we might say, the entropy  
law and the economic process, and he tried unsuccessfully to convince Marx that 
this could be brought into the Marxist analysis. His work has been seen as a first  
effort to develop ecological economics. Politically he was not a Marxist, he was a 
Ukrainian federalist narodnik. He had critiziced Marx’s overpowering behaviour 
at the congress of the International of 1872, praising the anarchist James 
Guillaume. However, he himself saw his work on the energetics of agriculture as a 
contribution to Marxist theory. He wrote to Marx on 8 April 1880: “With 
particular impatience I wait for your opinion on my attempt to bring surplus 
labour and the current physical theories into harmony”.  
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In his essay (published in long versions in Russian in 1880 and in German in 1883, 
and in short French and Italian versions in 1880 and 1881)
1 Podolinsky started by 
explaining the laws of energetics, quoting from Clausius that although the energy 
of the Universe was a constant, there was a tendency towards the dissipation of 
energy or, in Clausius’ terminology, there was a tendency for entropy to reach a 
maximum.  Podolinsky considered Rankine’s idea, that heat energy dissipated in 
outer space could be concentrated again, and he accepted Clausius’ objections to 
it. Podolinsky did not discuss explicitly the difference in thermodynamics between 
open, closed and isolated systems, although he stated as the starting point of his 
analysis that at the present time the Earth was receiving enormous quantities of 
energy from the sun, and would do so for a very long time. All physical and 
biological phenomena were expressions of the transformations of energy. He did 
not enter into the controversies regarding the creation of the Universe and its 
“heat-death”, nor did he discuss the relations between thermodynamics and the 
theory of evolution.  
 
He explained that plants assimilated energy, and animals fed on plants and 
degraded energy. This formed the Kreislauf des Lebens: “We have in front of us 
two parallel processes which together form the so-called circle of life. Plants have 
the property of accumulating solar energy, but the animals, when they feed on 
vegetable substances, transform a part of this saved energy and dissipate this 
energy into space. If the quantity of energy accumulated by plants is greater than 
that dispersed by animals, then stocks of energy appear, for instance in the period 
when mineral coal was formed, during which vegetable life was preponderant over 
animal life. If, on the contrary, animal life were preponderant, the provision of 
energy would be quickly dispersed and animal life would have to go back to the 
limits determined by vegetable wealth. So, a certain equilibrium would have to be 
built between the accumulation and the dissipation of energy”. 
 
Not only plants, also human labour had the virtue of retarding the dissipation of 
energy. Human labour achieved this by agriculture, although the work of tailors, 
schoemakers or builders would also qualify as productive work, since they afford 
“protection against the dissipation of energy into space”. The energy available for 
humankind came mainly from the sun. Podolinsky gave figures for the solar 
constant. He explained how coal and oil, wind energy and water power, were 
transformations of solar energy. He mentioned tides as another possible source of 
energy. He then started his analysis of the energetics of agriculture, remarking 
that only a very small proportion of sun energy was assimilated by plants.  
 
Human work in agriculture, and the work of animals directed by humans, were 
able to increase the availability of energy. This he showed by comparing the 
productivity of different types of land use taking statistics from France (he was 
living at the time in Montpellier). Table 1 summarizes his data (Martinez-Alier 
with Schlüpmann, 1987: 48). Podolinsky then compared wheat agriculture and 
sown pastures to natural pastures and forest, concluding that production was 
                                                           
1 S.A. Podolinsky, Trud cheloveka i ego otnoshenie k raspredeleniiu energii, Slovo, 4/5, 1880, p. 135-211. 
That is, Human labour and its relations to the distribution of energy. (A Spanish translation has been 
published in Martinez-Alier ed., 1995).  The German version with the title Menschliche Arbeit und 
Einheit der Kraft, appeared in March-April 1883 in Die Neue Zeit, the new journal of the Social 
Democratic Party (i.e. the Marxist party).  21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
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higher when there was an input of human and animal work. Thus, comparing 
wheat agriculture to natural pastures, each kcal put in contributed to an increase 
of 22 kcal of production. If forests were taken as the terms of comparison, the 
energy productivity of human and domestic animals work was even higher. Notice 
that Podolinsky was counting human and animal work, that is, not the food intake 
but the work done. He did not include solar radiation in the input of energy 
because he was not writing as a biologist but as an ecological economist. Solar 
radiation is indeed a free gift of Nature (moreover, without an owner so that there 
is no payment of rent). 
 
TABLE 1 
Annual production, and energy input (only work by humans and domestic 
animals) per hectare, averages for France in 1870, according to Podolinsky 
  Production (kg)  Production (kcal)  Energy input (kcal) 
Forest 900  (dried  wood)  2,295,000 Nil 
Natural pastures  2,500 (hay)  6,375,000  Nil 
Sown pastures  3,100 (hay, excluding seed)  7,905,000  37,450  (50  horse-hours 
and 80 man-hours) 
Wheat    800 (wheat) and 2,000 (straw) 
(excluding seed)      
8,100,000 77,500  (100  horse-hours 
and 200 man-hours) 
 
Energy values of wood, hay and straw, 2,550 kcal/kg, of wheat 3,750 kcal/kg. Hours of work converted 
into kcal: 645 kcal/hour of horse-work, 65 kcal/hour of man-work. 
 
The conclusion was that work could increase the “accumulation of energy on 
earth”. Although Podolinsky mentioned guano, and although he must been keenly 
aware of the war then raging for Peruvian or Chilean saltpetre, he did not 
substract from the output, or include in the input, the energy contents and cost of 
fertilizer. Nor did he consider the energy spent for steam engines for threshing. His 
methodology is nevertheless basically the same as that used later for establishing 
the energy balance of particular crops, or for small scale societies, or for the entire 
agricultural sector of particular countries (Cottrell, 1955, Rappaport, 1967, H.T. 
Odum, 1971, Pimentel, 1973, 1979, Leach, 1976,  Fluck and Baird, 1980). 
 
Podolinsky then went on to explain the capacity of the human organism to do 
work. Otherwise “it would be difficult to explain the accumulation of energy on the 
surface of the earth under the influence of labour”. Quoting from Hirn, Helmholtz, 
Marey, mentioning his own professors Hermann and  Haindenhain, and also Fick, 
he concluded correctly that “man has the capacity to transform one-fifth of the 
energy gained from food into muscular work”, giving to this ratio the name of 
“economic coefficient”, remarking that man was a more efficient transformer of 
energy than a steam engine. Now, for humanity to ensure its elementary conditions 
of existence, each calorie of human work must then have a productivity of five 
calories. Taking into account that not everybody is able to work (children, old 
people), and that there are other energy needs apart from food energy, the 
necessary minimum productivity would be more like ten or more. If that minimum 
was not achieved, then of course “scarcity appears and, many times, a reduction of 
population”. Podolinsky then established the basis for a view of the economy in 
terms of energetic social metabolism, looking at the energy return to energy input 
in a framework of reproduction of the social system. He used a steam-engine 
metaphor to put across a general theoretical principle on the minimum natural 
conditions of human existence. He wrote that humanity was a “perfect machine” in 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
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Sadi Carnot’s sense: “humanity is a machine that not only turns heat and other 
physical forces into work, but succeeds also in carrying out the inverse cycle, that 
is,  it turns work into heat and other physical forces which are necessary to satisfy 
our needs, and, so to speak, with its own work turned into heat is able to heat its 
own boiler”. He thought than he had reconciled the Physiocrats with the labour 
theory of value, although the Physiocrats (in the 18
th century) could not have seen 
the economy in terms of energy flow.  
 
Podolinsky also emphasized the difference between using the flow of solar energy 
and the stock of energy in coal. The task of labour was to increase the 
accumulation of solar energy on earth rather than the simple transformation into 
work of energy already accumulated on earth, more so since work done with coal 
was inevitably accompanied by a great dissipation of heat-energy into space. The 
energy productivity of a coalminer was much larger than that a farmer could 
obtain, but this energy surplus from coal was transitory, and moreover 
(Podolinsky added in a footnote) there was a theory which linked climatic changes 
to concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, as Sterry Hunt explained at 
a meeting of the British Society for the Advancement of Science in the autumn of 
1878. Notice here that the emphasis was not on capital accumulation in financial 
terms but on increasing the availability of energy and certainly also its dissipation. 
Podolinsky was not, however, at all pessimistic about the prospects for the 
economy, and he was hopeful for the direct use of solar energy for industrial 
purposes, referring to the “solar engine of M. Mouchot” (Mouchot, 1869). One 
could also envisage that one day solar energy would be used directly to make 
chemical syntheses of nutritive substances, by-passing agriculture. Thus, a proper 
discussion of the demographic question had to take into account the relations 
between the general quantity of energy on earth and the quantity of people who 
live on it, and this was a more relevant consideration, in his explicit view, than the 
Malthusian prognosis. In March 1880 he published an article against social-
Darwinism. He wrote that the availability of energy was a crucial consideration for 
the increase (or decrease) of population. However, he thought that the distribution 
of production was explained by the relations between social classes: “in the 
countries where capitalism triumphs, a great part of work goes towards the 
production of luxury goods, that is to say, towards a gratuitous dissipation of 
energy instead of towards increasing the availability of energy”. 
 
He was also hoping (as he had written to Marx on 30 March 1880, sending his 
work to him) to develop applications of his energy accounts to different forms or 
modes of production. Marx died in 1883 and apparently never commented on 
Podolinsky’s work, beyond a letter of acknowledgement in the first days of April 
1880. He apparently asked Engels to write a comment, which Engels did not do 
until December 1882. Podolinsky himself became ill in 1881, and never recovered 
until his death ten years later, back in Kiev. 
 
Engels’ reaction to Podolinsky 
 
Engels had some knowledge of the energetics of human physiology, and in a note of 
1875 (later included in the Dialectics of Nature) he referred to Fick’s and 
Wislicenus’ experiment in climbing the Faulhorn in 1865, which became 
popularized under the name “A day of hunger for science”. Fick (1829-1901) had 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
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written in 1857 and 1858 on the amount of kilocalories (2,700) that a man would 
need and spend per day, when not working, and how different types of work 
inplied different energy expenditures over that rate. An idea being circulated at 
the time (for instance, in an article in Das Ausland in 1877, 50: 298) was that the 
economic values of different types of work could be established in physical terms. 
Engels already explicitly rejected this notion in 1875. 
 
On 19 and 22 December 1882, Engels wrote two letters to Marx (about one 
thousand words) explaining that Podolinsky had “discovered” the following facts, 
already well known. If the food intake of one person per day were equal, say, to 
10,000 kilocalories (literally “heat units”), then the physical work done would be 
fraction of this energy. This physical work could become economic work if 
employed in fixing solar energy, for instance through agricultural activity.   
Podolinsky’s discovery was that human labour employed in agriculture had the 
power of detaining solar energy on the earth’s surface and permitting its activity 
longer than would be the case without it. All the economic conclusions he drew 
from this were wrong. The economic labour which a man working in agriculture 
performed by the employment of these 10,000 kcal consisted in the fixation for a 
greater or less time of new energy radiated to him from the sun. Whether, 
however, the new  quantity of energy fixated by the application of the original 
10,000 kcal of daily nourishment “reaches 5,000, 10,000, 20,000 or 1,000,000 kcal, 
depends solely on the degree of development attained by the means of production”. 
Besides, in agriculture, “the energy value of the auxiliary materials, manures, etc. 
also enters into the calculation” – a perceptive comment that directly makes one 
think of the agricultural energy balances of the 1970s (Pimentel, 1973, Leach, 
1976) which showed that the energy return to energy input of modern agriculture 
was on the decline. “In industry”, wrote Engels, “all calculation comes to an end: 
in most cases the work added to the product (he wrote on 19 December 1892) can 
no longer be expressed in kilocalories”. Engels was certainly right that in 
industrial production there would not be a net gain of energy – on the contrary, 
there would be more available energy in the raw materials than in the final 
product although in economic terms the final product would be more valuable. 
Actually, also in agriculture the energy in the product does not come from human 
work, it comes really from photosynthesis, human labour helping  and guiding the 
process ny selecting the seeds and performing other tasks. In fact, Engels wrote on 
22 December 1982, “storage of energy through work really takes place only in 
agriculture; in cattle raising the energy accumulated in the plants is simply 
transferred as a whole to the animals, and one can only speak of a storage of 
energy in the sense that without cattle-raising, nutritious plants wither uselessly, 
whereas with it they are utilised. In all branches of industry, on the other hand, 
energy is only expended… So that if one chooses one can translate into a physical 
language  (ins Physikalische übersetzen) the old economic fact that all industrial 
producers have to live from the products of agriculture, cattle raising, hunting, 
and fishing – but there is hardly much to be gained from doing so”. Engels also 
wrongly wrote that “the energy value of a hammer, a screw or a needle calculated 
according to the costs of production is an impossible quantity”, concluding: “In my 
opinion it is absolutely impossible to try and express economic relations in physical 
magnitudes”. We are here as far away as possible from the “social metabolic” or 
“ecological economic” perspective. 
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Engels was most unfair when he wrote: “What Podolinsky has entirely forgotten is 
that man as a worker is not merely a fixer of present solar heat but a still greater 
squanderer of past solar heat. The stores of energy, coal, ores, forests, etc. we 
succeed in squandering you know better than I”.  Podolinsky had not forgotten 
this at all. Finally, Engels also wrote: “Podolinsky has strayed away from his very 
valuable discovery into mistaken paths because he was trying to find in natural 
science a new proof of the truth of socialism, and has therefore confused physics 
and economics”. 
 
Engels’ negative reaction to Podolinsky’s work, and Marx’s silence from 1880 to 
the end of his life in 1883  (three years in which he was still intelectually active, 
much involved in discussions on the Russian peasant commune), may be seen as a 
missed change for an ecological Marxism. Actually Podolinsky’s work is relevant 
not only in the Marxist context. His work and life have an entity of its own, apart 
from his encounters with Marx and Engels. He had a short life but he left a strong 
trace in Ukrainian federalist thought (as a friend of Drahomanov) and also in the 
Narodnik movements against the Russian autocracy (as a young colleague of Piotr 
Lavrov but also connected to the Narodnaya Volya group). He was trained as a 
medical doctor and physiologist.  Forty years later, his work on energy and the 
economy received Vernadsky’s approval. In a section of  La Géochimie (1924) 
Vernadsky wrote about several authors (Felix Auerbach with his notion of 
Ektropismus, John Joly) who explained life as a process which used energy and 
reversed or slowed down the dissipation of energy. He then added a memorable 
phrase: Podolinsky had studied the energetics of life and tried to apply his findings 
to the study of the economy (Vernadsky, 1924: 334-5).  
 
The link between the use of energy and human culture, in the form of “social 
energetics” (although without historical statistical work) became well established 
and debated in European culture around 1900. Some marxist authors (Bogdanov, 
1873-1928, Bukharin, 1888-1938) adopted this outlook, and their work has been 
seen (Susiluoto, 1982) as an anticipation of Bertalanffy’s systems theory which 
grew out of the links between thermodynamics and biology. But, to repeat, there is 
no Marxist historiography based on quantitative studies of material and energy 
social metabolism. No clear line of descent from Marxism to ecological economics, 
agroecology, urban ecology, industrial ecology. Moreover, Lenin wrote a diatribe 
against Ostwald’s social energetics in the context of his polemics against Bogdanov 
and against Mach’s “empiriocriticism” (Martinez-Alier with Schlüpmann, 1987: 
225-8). This was before the October Revolution of 1917. Afterwards,  Lenin’s ill-
considered remarks became sacred to the faithful. Thus, on the occasion of the 
publication of Engels’ “book” Dialectics of Nature in 1925 (out of drafts and notes 
he had left behind) on the thirtieth anniversary of his death, Otto Jenssen printed 
again Engels’ letters to Marx on Podolinsky (which were first published in 1919), 
and explained that Engels had anticipated a critique of Ostwald’s social energetics 
even before Ostwald himself appeared on the scene (Jenssen, 1925: 13). 
 
Otto Neurath’s Naturalrechnung 
 
Marx wrote that wealth was undoubtedly created both by human labour and by 
Nature, quoting William Petty: “Labour is the Father, Nature is the Mother”. 
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interesting point is the distinction between wealth and use values (on the one hand) 
and exchange values (on the other hand). Marx quoted Aristotle’s distinction 
between oikonomia (dealing with the use values delivered by the material 
provisioning of the human economy) and chrematistics (as the study of market 
prices). Ecological economists from Soddy to Daly, and economic anthropologists 
and historians who follow Karl Polanyi, emphasize this distinction. Beyond the 
analysis of the oikonomia, Marx’s main objective was to explain in a capitalist 
wage economy the appropriation of surplus labour. Such exploitation was not so 
obvious as in a slave economy or a feudal (serf) economy, since wages were 
apparently freely established in a market. Surplus labour became surplus value. 
In my view, an important contribution to the links between Marxism and a 
biophysical approach to the economy was made later, in the first half of the 20
th 
century, by Otto Neurath (1882-1945). A famous philosopher of the Vienna Circle, 
he was also an economist or economic historian, and a Marxist in at least two 
senses. First, in the so-called Socialist Calculation debate of the 1920s, he defended 
a democratically planned economy based on physical accounting in energy and 
material terms (Naturalrechnung) influenced by Popper-Lynkeus’ and Ballod-
Atlanticus’ quantitative, realistic “utopias”. Neurath explained that in order to 
compare two economic plans, achieving the same objetive, a capitalist 
entrepreneur would use money values. However, in a socialist economy, how would 
we able to compare a plan using more human labour and less coal, with a plan 
using less human labour and more coal? In principle, using less painful human 
work and more coal would be good, even if it implied using more energy 
altogether, but a decision would also need appraisals of the uncertain development 
of future technologies (hydropower, solar energy), and also our moral regard for 
future generations would play a role in the comparison. Neurath introduced 
therefore the idea of incommensurable values in the economy. Neurath’s idea was 
also emphasized by K.W. Kapp. Incommensurability of values is seen as a 
foundation for ecological economics (Martinez-Alier with Schlüpmann, 1987, 
O’Neill, 1993, Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neill, 1998, O’Neill, 2002). Second, 
some years later, in the context of the Vienna Circle’ project of the Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science of the 1930s and 1940s, Neurath saw himself as a marxist and 
defended a dialectical view of history (although he did not like the word 
“dialectics”) as the putting together the findings of the different sciences regarding 
concrete processes or events. The findings of one science, collected in the 
Encyclopedia, with regard to one particular process or event, should not be 
contradicted by the assumptions or the findings of another science also present in 
the Encyclopedia, and leave things at that. “Consilience” (to use today’s word by 
Edward Wilson) should be the rule of the Encyclopedia.  
Hayek’s strong  criticism againt “social engineering” (1952) was directed, as John 
O’Neill has put it, “at the whole tradition which attempts to understand the ways 
in which economic institutions and relations are embedded within the physical 
world and have real physical preconditions, and which is consequently critical of 
economic choices founded upon purely monetary valuation”. Translated into 
Foster’s language (Foster, 2000):  Hayek critized those who view the economy in 
terms of “social metabolism”. While Patrick Geddes, Wilhelm Ostwald, Frederick 
Soddy and Lewis Mumford were all rudely dismissed by Hayek, it was the work of 
Otto Neurath that was the primary target of Hayek’s criticism. 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
  13
One is also reminded of Max Weber’s comments against Otto Neurath in Economy 
and Society but even more of his critique of Wilhelm Ostwald in 1909. Ostwald (a 
well known chemist) was trying to interpret human history in terms of the use of 
energy. He proposed two simple laws, which are not untrue, and which might act 
or not in opposite directions. First, the growth of the economy implied the use of 
more energy, and the substitution of human energy by other forms of energy. 
Second, this came together with a trend towards higher efficiency in the 
transformation of energy inside each technology. Max Weber (1909) wrote a 
famous, ironic review of Ostwald’s views, where he insisted on the separation 
between the sciences. Chemists should not write on the economy. The review was 
much praised by Hayek in the 1940s. Max Weber’s basic point (Martinez-Alier 
with Schlüpmann, 1987, chapter 12) was that decisions by entrepreneurs on new 
industrial processes or new products were based on prices. It could so happen that 
a production process was less efficient in energy terms and nevertheless it would be 
adopted because it was cheaper. Energy accounting was irrelevant for the 
economy. Max Weber did no question energy prices.  
Ostwald influenced many authors, among them Henry Adams (1838-1918) who 
proposed a “law of acceleration” in the use of energy: “the coal output of the 
world, speaking roughly, doubled every ten years between 1840 and 1900, in the 
form of utilized power, for the ton of coal yielded three or four times as much 
power in 1900 as in 1840”.  Since Marxism is in this article under critical review, it 
is worthwhile pointing out that from the opposite camp, Karl Popper in The 
Poverty of Historicism which is directed against Marxist laws of history, thought it 
worthwhile to attack also Henry Adams in a footnote (without ever mentioning the 
word “energy”) because Henry Adams dared propose a historical law. Henry 
Adams quoted Marx as a remote source for his law of acceleration in the use of 
energy (in terms of used power, not of primary energy). However he was certainly 
not a Marxist, on the contrary he was a Bostonian aristocrat who thought the 
world would probably come to a bad end socially and technologically.
2 
When the anthropologist Leslie White (1943) wrote on energy and the evolution of 
culture, he realized that Ostwald and Soddy were precursors of his views but he 
did not quote Podolinsky although he also looked for stages of evolution in terms of 
harnessing energy in increasing magnitudes and in various forms, in a dialectical 
interplay between the technological level (defined by the availability and the 
efficiency in the transformation of energy), the social system (in terms of Marxist 
“relations of production”) and the cultural-symbolic system. 
Marx’ doubts on the benefits of economic growth expressed in his ecological 
critique of capitalist agriculture, were not forgotten within Marxism (think of 
Walter Benjamin and Raymond Williams). However,  the tecnological optimists 
who believed in the development of the productive forces,  predominated. One  
most influential in mid-20
th century was the historian of science J.D. Bernal. He 
was in the 1950s totally in favour of the “civil” use of nuclear energy, which Lewis 
Mumford was strongly critizicing already at the time (Thomas, 1956: 1147). 
Mumford, described by Ramachandra Guha as  the “forgotten American 
environmentalist” (in comparison to to G.P. Marsh, John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, 
                                                           
2 Martinez-Alier with Schlüpmann, 1987, chapter 8: Henry Adams’ “Law of Acceleration” in the Use of 
Energy. 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
  14
Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson) was a heir to John Ruskin, William Morris and 
Patrick Geddes, he does not belong in the Marxist tradition. 
3 
 
Mumford’s mentor, Patrick Geddes (1854-1932), a biologist and urban planner,  
early on attacked neoclassical economists such as Walras because they did not 
count flows of energy, materials and waste (Martinez-Alier with Schlüpmann, 
1987, chapter 6) but he did not discuss Marx.  Geddes (1884) proposed the 
construction of a sort of input-output table inspired by the Tableau Economique of 
the Physiocrat François Quesnay. The first column would contain the sources of 
energy as well as the sources of the materials which were used, not for their 
potential energy, but for their other properties. Energy and materials were 
tranformed into products through three stages, extraction, manufacture, and 
transport and exchange. Estimates were needed of the losses (dissipation and 
disintegration) at each stage. The quantity of the final product (or “net” product, 
in Physiocratic terms) might seem surprisingly small in proportion to the gross 
quantity of potential product. Now, however, the losses at each stage were not 
accounted for in economic terms. The final product was not added value at all. It 
was the value remaining from the energy and materials available at the beginning 
once they had been through all three stages.  In today’s language we say, the 
exergy in the raw materials is larger than in the final products. 
 
The languages of unequal trade 
 
Geddes’ scheme is relevant to the attempt by several authors today to develop a 
theory of ecologically unequal exchange between the metropolitan centres and the 
world peripheries. Recent work on Material Flow Accounting by ecological 
economists and industrial ecologists shows that the European Union imports 
almost four times as many tons as it exports, while Latin America exports six times 
more tons than it imports (Giljum and Eisenmenger, in press). Material flow 
accounts are a good approximation to exergy accounts. Historical statistics on such 
currents of trade (including also the “ecological rucksacks”) would be most 
relevant to world systems theory. (Carpintero, 2002, has published the material 
flows for the last forty years of the Spanish economy, it would be interesting to 
have Spanish figures for the last 500 years). A precise accounting of the “ecological 
rucksacks” today requires research on the “carbon dioxide” terms of trade. In the 
past and today, it requires research on the embodied pollution terms of trade (for 
other polluting substances). This is being done (Muradian et al., 2002). One may 
argue therefore that the existence of ecologically unequal trade is an empirically 
proven fact based on research on  “social metabolism” (Muradian and Martinez-
Alier 2001,  Hubacek and Giljum, 2001, Giljum and Hubacek, 2003, Giljum in 
press).  In an ecological economics theory of unequal exchange, one could say that 
the more of the original exergy [available energy or “productive potential” in the 
exported raw materials] has been dissipated in producing the final products or 
services (in the metropolis), the higher the prices of these products or services will 
be (Hornborg, 1998a, Naredo and Valero, 1999). Thus, Hornborg concludes, 
“market prices are the means by which world system centres extract exergy from 
the peripheries”, sometimes helped, one must say, by military power.  
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However,  neoclassical economists will argue that unequal trade in terms of exergy 
(or in terms of tons) is not evidence of economic exploitation.  In neoclassical 
economics, provided that markets are competitive and ruled by supply and 
demand, there cannot be unequal exchange. This can only arise from monopoly or 
monopsony condictions, or because of non-internalized externalities (or excessive 
discounting of the future). In neoclassical economics, the theory of incomplete 
markets tries to provide explanations of why externalities might arise and what 
problems they might bring to known welfare propositions. A substantial part of 
the recent application of this framework to study trade and environmental issues 
focuses on the presence of incomplete property rights over natural resources and 
services to explain why trade might not be necessarily welfare improving for the 
exporting country. Shrimp farming destroys mangroves - never mind, this naïf 
body of theory says that such losses could be monetarized through appropriate 
property rights and appropriate markets on the livelihood and ecological functions 
of mangroves, and then we could know exactly what the balance is. Another way of 
putting this point across: negative environmental externalities derived from the 
export activity can be introduced in the standard trade theory approach by 
bringing the distinction between private and social marginal cost of production or 
extraction. However, the applicability of standard economic reasoning necessarily 
implies aggregating the externalities, at present values, under a unique numeraire. 
Economic valuation will depend on relative incomes and on power relations. 
Moreover, many of the negative effects derived from economic activities cannot be 
translated into a unique monetary measure. The problem becomes only harder 
when we consider that the externalities might reach the future as well as the 
present. In that case, the problem is not only to translate the externalities of the 
present period into money value but also of the future periods, something that 
forces us to choose a discount rate, and therefore to choose an intertemporal 
distributional pattern of costs and benefits. Today neoclassical economists have 
learnt to talk of Pigouvian taxes and “natural capital depletion taxes” because of 
local or global externalities (such as the enhanced greenhouse effect), and because 
the intergenerational allocation of natural resources discounts too much the future. 
However, the inability to bring all externalities and the deterioration of natural 
resources into the measuring rod of money, and the issue of choosing a particular 
discount rate, make it hard to produce a chrematistic measure of ecologically 
unequal exchange. 
 
Standard economic theory points to the need to internalize externalities, something 
that to the extent possible, is desirable in order to bring the costs of extraction and 
exporting of natural resources closer to the “real” social costs. The point is that, it 
is precisely the limitations in achieving this goal, what pushes the analysis outside 
the neoclassical sphere, towards incommensurability of values (which means the 
absence of a common unit of measurement across plural values) (Cabeza and 
Martinez-Alier, 2001). Poor people are well advised to defend their interests in 
languages different from that of compensation for externalities, because in the 
economic sphere “Lawrence Summers’ principle” (“the poor sell cheap”) is 
operative. 
 
There are other languages in which the main lines of a theory of ecologically 
unequal exchanged may be expressed. The Ricardian theory of comparative 
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internally cheaper to produce in relative terms, all could win by trade. Subsequent 
elaborations of the theory showed that if countries specialized in productions 
which relied on the internally most abundant factors (say, natural resources as 
opposed to skilled labor or manufactured capital), all could win by trading freely. 
Critics pointed out that relying on comparative advantage would mean, in some 
cases, to remained locked-in in a pattern of production which excluded gains in 
productivity from economies of scale (i.e. the infant industry argument for 
protectionism). Moreover, the recognition that production involves also 
destruction and degradation of the environment (pointed out by Henry Carey in 
the United Sates already in the early 19
th century) brings a new argument against 
free trade between regions and countries. There is no need to argue for autarky, or 
for a strict “bioregional” position. From a purely ecological point of view, there is 
an argument for importing imports the lack of which would limit production, in 
the sense of Liebig’s law of the minimum (Pfaundler, 1902).  
 
Marx showed that the exploitation of labour (the appropriation of its surplus 
labour) would cause crises in capitalism. The money value of the products could 
not be realized because of lack of purchasing power from the exploited proletariat. 
Imperialism, it was argued later, arose from the competition between states to get 
new markets for their own capitalists. Imperialism also was useful for the 
appropriation of new sources of labour (not necessarily wage labour, also slaves or 
indebted labour) and new raw materials. Imperialism came together with 
Raubwirtschaft. The process of destruction of Nature that lies behing ecologically 
unequal trade was already described by some geographers in the 19
th century as 
Raubwirtschaft (Raumoulin, 1984). Jean Brunhes explained this term in his well 
known Geographie humaine. Carl Sauer also mentioned it. There have been three 
main lines in the links between geography and history. First, the “determinist” line 
(which in a Marxist context would be associated with the so-called Wittfogel’s 
thesis). Second, the “conditioning” line, shown in Braudel’s idea of the longue 
durée: the geography does not determine but it helps to explain historical   
economic and political phenomena. Economy and politics change more rapidly 
than the geography. Third, the line of Raubwirtschaft or “the human role in 
changing the face of the Earth”. Thus, in America and Oceania, human 
depopulation and species invasion after the European contact and conquest took 
place quickly. No longue durée in the ecology of America under Philippe II 
(Crosby,  1986, Melville, 1994) (Today, climate change is perhaps quicker than 
political change). 
 
Combining ecological economics and political ecology in the study of the state-
sponsored large projects in the 1970s in the Northern Amazonian region of Brazil 
(mainly iron and aluminum exports), two pioneering authors (Bunker, 1985, 
Altvater, 1987, 1993) reached the idea of ecologically unequal exhange. We move 
out of a purely economic language, because the concept focusses on the poverty and 
the lack of political power of the exporting region (Bunker, 1985) to emphasize the 
idea of lack of alternative options, in terms of exporting other renewable goods 
with lower local impacts, or in terms of internalizing the externalities in the price 
of exports. Bunker emphasized then the lack of local political power in the 
exporting region. Differing “production times” together with the valorization 
(mise-en-valeur) of new territories are the notions that Altvater brought into play 
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capital accumulation. Capitalism necessarily incorporates new spaces by means of 
new transport systems in order to extract natural resources. Spatial relations being 
modified, temporal relations are altered as well because production in the newly 
incorporated spaces can no longer be governed by the time of reproduction of 
nature. Capitalism needs new territories and accelerates the production times. The 
antagonism (noticed long ago by Frederick Soddy) between economic time, which 
proceeds according to the quick rhythm imposed by capital circulation and the 
interest rate, and geo-chemical-biological time controlled by the rhythms of 
nature, is expressed in the irreparable destruction of nature and of local cultures 
which valued its resources differently. Nature is an open system, and some of its 
organisms grow sustainably at very rapid rates, but this is not the case of the raw 
materials and products exported by the South. By placing a market value on new 
spaces we change also the production times, and economic time triumphs, at least 
apparently, over ecological time. 
 
Hence the renewed relevance of the Latin American theory of deteriorating terms 
of trade, as proposed in the later 1940s by the Argentinian economist Raul 
Prebisch. This theory was the backbone for the CEPAL’s proposals from the 1950s 
to 1973 on “import substitution”  - 1973 saw the fall of Allende in Chile, and the 
inauguration of economic neo-liberalism under Pinochet. The theory, which has 
precedents in eastern Europe in the period between the world wars, explains that 
increases in productivity in the primary export sectors (that is, larger production 
per worker thanks to technological progress) are translated into lower prices, 
because of three reasons. First, despite attempts at forming cartels, there are many 
international competititors. Second, the income-elasticity of demanad for such 
products is low. Third, the workers are poor, often non-unionized, and there is an 
ample supply of unemployed labour - this was so in Central American banana 
plantations, and in Bolivian mines, not so much in the Argentina of Peron. In the 
meantime, the prices of imported manufactured goods and services do not drop in 
proportion to the increases in productivity, because the market structure is more 
oligopolistic, and the workers, unionised and already well paid, are in a strong 
bargaining position which allows them to raise salaries at least in proportion to the 
increase in productivity. Hence, the trend towards worsening terms of trade for 
primary producers. The theory is open to objections. For example, in some periods 
economies can grow on the basis of primary exports, and these open economies can 
create significant urban and industrial bases. This has been called the staple theory 
of economic growth, after the work of the Canadian historian Harold Innis, 
himself critical of this mode of development. It applies to some periods of the 
economic history of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the Scandinavian countries, 
also to regions such as Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo. Another objection is that 
industrial products and services are also subject to competitive commercial 
pressures which lower their prices, as it has occurred with cars and with 
information technology. However, the theory of the deterioration of the terms of 
trade is again relevant. There is a real deterioration in the terms of trade, and also 
(as Marxist economists such as Emmanuel (1972) had explained) many hours of 
badly paid work are “exported” in exchange for a few well paid hours. Such 
theories now are complemented by adding to them the environmental component. 
 
Attemps at counting in physical units the use of the environment attached to trade 
have been present in the literature for some time, before the recent flourishing of 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
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Material Flow Accounting. H.T.Odum’s theory of unequal exchange in terms of 
“emergy” is an example (Odum and Arding, 1991). Emergy is defined as embodied 
energy. Odum was concerned with exposing unequal exchange of emergy between 
regions or nations, and he discussed trade in terms of their emergy exchange ratio. 
The periphery is underpaid for the emergy content of its natural resources because 
they are not properly valued in the market. The problem, as Hornborg points out 
(Hornborg, 1998a), is whether Odum intended to give us a normative or a positive 
approach. That is, whether the emergy content is something that should be used to 
determine how exports should be paid for, and thus we should aim at an emergy-
equity trade, or is just something to be used descriptively, an indicator about 
unbalances in trade along with measurements in tons of materials, in “ghost 
acreage” or “ecological footprints”, in hours of work, and in money. Trade policy 
should then take into account several indicators which perhaps show different 
trends. (The emergy values have moreover specific problems in calculation which 
are not discussed here).  
 
Finally, as mentioned before, Hornborg proposes the use of the concept of exergy 
to provide a foundation for a theory of unequal trade. Exergy stands for available 
energy. Hornborg argues that market prices are the specific mechanism by which 
world centres extract exergy from, and export entropy to, their peripheries 
(Hornborg, 1998a). The disposal of waste, like carbon dioxide emissions, with zero 
money cost, is another key factor to understand economic growth in the North. 
Hornborg’s point is a crucial one because it stresses the importance of 
understanding the mechanism by which unequal exchange take splace. Still, the 
use of exergy would only account for one aspect of the link between extraction of 
resources and the environment. The important point is not the difficulty of 
calculation. In any case the values obtained would be less arbitrary than the 
money-values given (for instance) to externalities such as the loss of biodiversity. 
The essential point is that incommensurability applies not only to money value but 




The recent attempts to organise “Fair Trade” networks by means of cooperation of 
the North with the South (consumers who, for example, are willing to pay a higher 
price for imported “organic” coffee) stem from the awareness that consumption 
drives the economy and from a willingness to incorporate certain social and 
environmental costs in the price. Conversely, those costs are not internalised in the 
prices which apply in normal production and marketing. There is no “fair trade” 
in oil or copper. The “Fair Trade” movements shows in practice that in order to 
allow exported products to be produced in ecologically and socially sustainable 
processes, importers must be ready to pay a premium.  
 
Selling at prices which do not include compensation for environmental 
externalities and for the exhaustion of resources can be described as “ecological 
dumping”. This happens not only in the trade of natural resources from South to 
North but also sometimes from North to South, such as agricultural exports from 
the United States or Europe to the rest of the world which are directly subsidized, 
and also indirectly because of cheap energy, no deductions from water and soil 
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We describe the first kind of ecological dumping (from South to North) as 
ecologically unequal exchange to emphasize the fact that most extractive 
economies are often poor, powerless, and therefore unable to slow down the rate of 
resource exploitation or to charge “natural capital depletion taxes”, unable to 
internalize externalities into prices, and unable to diversify their exports.  Thus, 
contrary to the view that environmental non-tariff trade restrictions are a 
manifestation of “Northern” protectionism at the cost of “Southern” producers, 
there are “Southern” demands for “Northern” consumers to boycott “Southern” 
exports because of their social and environmental effects. Such voices are largely 
unheeded, but they perhaps announce a different world where consumers will have 
information on the processes of production of the products they consume. 
 
“Dumping” implies a voluntary decision to export at a price lower than costs. 
When oil is exported from the Niger Delta, power and market relations are such 
that there is no possibility of including the social, cultural and environmental costs 
of oil extraction in the price. When a country like Peru exports gold and copper, 
and much environmental and human damage is suffered internally, it is not 
appropriate to say that the social values of the Peruvians are such that they care 
little for health and the environment. Rather, we should say that they are unable to 
defend their interests for a better environment and a better health because they 
are relatively poor and powerless. In an economic model, whatever the causes,  the 
result will be the same. The externalities (insofar as they are known) are not 
factored into the prices, it does not matter is this is a free choice or an imposed 
decision, whether they are inscrutable preferences or unjust social structures. 
 
Memories of guano and quebracho 
 
Oversupply of primary commodities, forced by a doctrine of export-led growth 
and by the obligation of servicing the external debt, leads to low prices. This must 
not be confused with a trend towards the material and energy “delinking” in the 
importing economies. The point needs some emphasis. Thus, an authoritative 
African view is that: “Current difficulties of such countries as Cote d’Ivoire and 
my own country, Cameroon, which until recently, were considered development 
models in Africa, can largely be explained by ... the fall of prices of African 
commodities in the international market”. Agreed, but why should this be so? 
“The main reason is that the quantity of raw materials now required for an 
industrial production unit represents only two fifths of what was needed in 1990, 
and this decline in demand for raw materials is accelerating. In this respect, the 
Japanese experience is particularly striking. In 1984, for each industrial 
production unit, Japan used only 60 percent of the raw materials it had used 
eleven years earlier, in 1973, for the same volume of industrial production. The 
example of some industries is also significant. Thus, it is possible to send as many 
telephone messages with a glass fiber of 50 to 100 pounds as with a ton of copper 
wire. However, the production of the 100 pounds of glass fiber does not require 
more than five percent of the energy needs for the production of the ton of copper 
wire. Similarly, plastic that is more and more replacing steel in automobile bodies 
is only half the cost of steel, energy and raw materials included. Reliance on raw 
materials as sources of income for exports cannot therefore be a wise long-term 
policy for African governments; to the contrary”. (Doo Kingue, 1996:41). 
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One agrees with the conclusion, that reliance on exports of raw materials is bad 
economic policy, without fully agreeing with the premise of “dematerialization”. 
Witness in that region the new Chad-Cameroon pipeline to ship oil for exports. 
The volume of materials exported from South to North which is far higher than 
the volume imported,  is not decreasing in absolute terms. True, some bulk raw 
materials may become technologically obsolete, as it happened to the exports of 
Chilean saltpetre, which were substituted by nitrogen obtained through the 
Birkeland-Eyde process and later the Haber process (during the First World War)  
In other cases, exhaustion or at least substantial depletion occurred before 
substitution arrived, even though the resources themselves were renewable, like 
the chinchona officinalis.  
 
Sometimes there are products which in principle would be be ecologically 
sustainable but are not, like extraction of guano in Peru between 1840 and 1880. 
Guano is a word in Quechua meaning “excrement” which has made it not only into 
Spanish but also into English. Certainly not a luxury good or “preciosity”. It is a 
substance that consists of the dried excrements of sea birds, and is used as a 
fertiliser.  It was not a commodity that had to be produced, its deposits already 
existed on small islands and promontories accesible to cargo ships. As remarked 
above, the large scale commercial exploitation of guano was contemporaneous to 
the birth of agricultural chemistry with Liebig’s and Boussingault’s publications. 
A chemical analysis of its contents  had been made by Fourcroy and Vauquelin, as 
the science of plant nutrients was being born. A few Peruvians already thought of  
“turning guano into railroads”, like the chemist Mariano de Rivero, born in 
Arequipa and trained in Paris, he was a colleague of Boussingault. About eleven 
million tons of guano were exported in four decades from Peru (Gootenberg, 1993; 
Martinez-Alier with Schlüpmann, 1987). Guano is  the same resource as fishmeal 
(even though at a later stage of the trophic chain), which was also exported from 
Peru at a non-sustainable rate in the 1960s and  early 1970s. Periodically, the 
warm waters of El Niño appear around Christmas (hence its name), provoking 
intense rains on the coast of Ecuador and the Piura dessert in northern Peru, also 
displacing or destroying the fisheries of anchovy ( Engraulis ringens) and other 
species, many birds dying of hunger. This natural phenomenon, locally well known 
(Lavalle, 1913:97), is today world famous because its global reach has been 
understood particularly after El Niño event of 1972-73. El Niño helps to explain 
the foretold collapse of the anchovy fishery in the early 1970s but not the near-
exhaustion of guano in 1880. Thinking of exports of Peruvian fishmeal, Borgstrom 
(1967) developed the notion of “ghost acreage” (which the South “exports” to the 
North), an ancestor of today’s well-known “ecological footprint” (Rees and 
Wackernagel, 1994).   
 
Good monographs have been written on Peruvian guano (Maiguashca,1967, 
Bonilla, 1994, Matthew, 1981),  from the financial and political more than 
ecological viewpoints. A.J. Duffield, towards the end of the Peruvian Guano Age of 
1840-80, reflected on the money that the guano deposits had aproduced and the 
uses to which it had been applied (in a “weak sustainability” framework, if one 
may use the words). He estimated the guano deposits still existing in Peru. He 
transcribed an optimistic dispatch sent by Juan Ignacio Elguera, the Peruvian 
Minister of Finance, for the benefit of overseas bondholders a few years before the 
start of the war of 1879: “However long the guano deposits may last, Peru always 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
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possesses the nitrate deposits of Tarapacá to replace them. Foreseeing the 
possibility of the former becoming exhausted, the Government has adopted 
measures by which it may secure a new source of income, in order that on the 
termination of the guano, the Republic may be able to continue to meet the 
obligations it is under to its foreign creditors” (Duffield, 1877: 102). This was 
indeed extremely “weak” sustainability on the verge of the Chilean takeover.  
 
The Peruvian guano economy, today a staple of ecological-economic history, 
provided in the 1960s the model for the theorization by Levin (1960) of the 
“enclave” economy, defined as an economy where economic linkages were lacking 
between the export sector and the internal economy. Peruvian guano was extracted 
by some local labor, and by Chinese imported indentured laborers. It was not 
produced buy quickly extracted and then “commoditized” or merchandised by 
European merchants from London and Paris. The U.S. arrived late to the great 
guano rush, no Monroe doctrine applying here. The U.S. Congress tried to make 
up for the delay by passing an Act in 1856 (which apparently is still in the current 
statutes) “to authorize protection to be given to citizens of the United States who 
may discover deposits of guano” in small islands, rocks or keys off the coast of 
Africa, the Caribbean, or the Pacific, or wherever they might be, provided they did 
not belong to other states or were nor occupied by citizens of other states. Nothing 
of much commercial value came out of this attempt at enjoying the  pleasures of 
open access to guano through newly well-defined property rights (Skaggs, 1994).  
 
The trade in quebracho (Schinopsis balansae) from Argentina is a story of the 20th 
century. 
4 It was used for railway sleepers, for posts, and for tannin extract for 
export, at a non-sustainable rate. There are two types of quebracho, white and red. 
The extract from red one was used since the end of the 19th century for tanning. It 
is a hard wood, which grows in isolated strips. The regions containing these slowly 
growing trees were the Chaco and Santa Fe, in Argentina. After some initial 
attempts by local entrepreneurs at developing an export industry of extracts, 
Baron Emile Beaumont d’Erlanger of London set up a company in 1906 known as 
La Forestal for the purpose of acquiring and further developing the business of the 
Compañía Forestal del Chaco. By 1911 the new company owned 1.5 million acres, 
and leased 0.5 million acres, by 1913 it grew to 5 million acres freehold, and 0.6 
leased (Hicks, 1956:7, 16). In 1920-21 there was much labour unrest, and the   
tannin factories in Argentina were locked-out. The 1920s became a period of 
expansion, the productive capacity of quebracho extract reaching 430,000 tons 
yearly in 1928 (for La Forestal and other minor companies) (Hicks, 1956:45). The 
company sold land cleared of quebracho for cattle rising, and for settlers. The 
official history of the company remarks that “of the vegetable tanning materials in 
common use at the end of the First World War  -oak, chestnut, spruce, quebracho, 
etc- quebracho was not only by far the cheapest, it was, and it is still today, the 
tanning agent which most rapidly penetrates the hide” (Hicks, 1956:22). Despite 
such advantages, La Forestal company diversified its sources, developing black 
wattle and mimosa tree plantations in Eastern and South Africa as a source of 
tannin. Argentina forbade the export of roundwood quebracho in 1928, to foment 
the production of tannin extract in its own territory. Later, during the Peron 
government from 1946 onwards, the regulation of export of quebracho extracts 
(through state control), and its taxation (as on agricultural exports in general) 
                                                           
4 I am grateful to Marcela Guerrero for references. 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
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were introduced. According to the official history of La Forestal, this attempt to 
increase export prices initially made Argentinian quebracho extract not 
competitive internationally but by the early 1950s a successful accomodation had 
temporarily been reached. More than 200,000 tons of extract were sold annually 
during the Korean war years. Many of La Forestal’s factories were in Santa Fe, 
where, in contrast with the Chaco, “supplies of quebracho trees round the factories 
were becoming exhausted” (Hicks, 1956:68). These factories had to be closed 
down. For the local populations, the abandoned settlements were to be regarded as 
the equivalent to mining ghost-towns. Large reserves of quebracho still existed in 
the Chaco, owned by the state, and new factories could be opened, though there 
was the threat from African plantations, and also a new threat: “the full impact of 
leather substitutes [such as artificial rubber] on the sale of leather, which in its 
turn may influence the demand for tanning materials, has not yet made itself fully 
felt” (Hicks, 1956:70).   
 
Here I shall use such cases in order to establish a typology regarding both 
renewable and exhaustible natural commodities or resources:  
 
a)  resources which are exploited at particular locations and exported at such a 
rate which they became (almost) exhausted, whether they are renewable or 
not (guano, oil, and certainly many metals the costs of extraction of which 
grow too much as the concentration diminishes).   
b)  resources which are exported at such a relatively slow rate that substitution 
intervenes and they become economically obsolete much before they are 
exhausted (Chilean saltpetre). They become non-essential commodities, in a 
material sense. 
c)  resources which are exploited at a rate quicker than renovation, whose 
stocks are depleted locally (such as the quebracho colorado), but of which it 
can be argued that a slower rate of exploitation would have been unwise, 
because of the threat of substitution. 
 
From the reality of many instances of substitution of particular raw materials 
which became non-essential, we cannot argue that growth of the economy will 
always endogenously make available “backstop” technologies. Against this view, 
economic growth achieves sometimes the remarkable feat of exhausting not only 
exhaustible resources but also renewable resources. Thus, depletion is quicker 
than production today in fishing grounds around the world. 
 
Preciosities, staples, and environmental “rucksacks”  
 
There is today a renewed interest in the old-fashioned Warenkunde  from the ranks 
of industrial ecologists who evaluate the “life-cycles” of products from “cradle to 
grave” and indeed from “grave to cradle” as waste is recycled. For example, in 
order to export one ton of aluminum, major inputs of bauxite are necessary, and in 
order to extract and move the bauxite a great deal of material and vegetation is 
destroyed. Then the large input of electricity for the smelting of the aluminum has 
also its own material rucksack. In order to export a luxury good such as cocaine, a 
lot of soil is eroded (growing coca leaf on slopes under precarious  conditions) and 
rivers are polluted by its production inputs (kerosene, sulfuric acid). Consider   
trade in ivory or rhino’s horns, diamonds, mahoganny, or other “preciosities” such 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
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as gold (with enormous ecological rucksacks in open cast mining, Muradian et al, 
2003) or shrimp (a large industry around the Tropics of over 10 billion US$ per 
year, grown at the expense of mangroves and human livelihoods). In the exporting 
coastal regions, people do not care whether shrimp are consumed in the metropolis 
as a luxury good or as a source of protein.  “Preciosities” with high economic 
value/ low weight ratios may have bulky environmental impacts on ecosystems and 
human livelihoods.  
 
World systems theory traced a contested distinction between essential commodities 
and “preciosities”, and one may wonder whether the “social metabolic” 
perspective may help clarify it. I am not sure. Market prices and trade figures in 
money are crucial in capitalism but they are also deceptive, we have to look to the 
flows of energy and materials. There are also the ecological linkages. 
Anthropologists objected to the view that exchanges of “preciosities”, as distint 
from trade in bulk, are not essential to the constitution of world systems 
(Schneider, 1977). They rightly argued that pure “prestige goods”, far from being 
superfluous, are on the contrary crucial in a social sense (as dowry for instance, or 
for the accumulation of political power in clientelistic systems). But there is more 
to be said. Some “preciosities” become staples. Sugar, as  Sidney Mintz showed,  
was a luxury good and became a source of cheap calories for industrial workers in 
the metropolis. This is indeed a “social metabolic” view of the issue. However, 
some “preciosities” remain preciosities. They are not essential inputs to production 
processes and they do not become cheap wage-goods. They are genuine luxury 
goods: perhaps their consumption drives the economy and destroys the 
environment. One is reminded of the large impact of Potosi in the Andean 
demography and social structure (including pollution from mercury).  
 
Clearly, the chrematistic point of view is still relevant (as argued by Max Weber 
against Ostwald) in order to explain the decisions of capitalist entrepreneurs 
regarding production and trade. The physical point of view is also relevant, in at 
least two senses. First, it allows us to signal different trends between two non-
equivalent descriptions of economic reality, the economic and the physical. Thus, 
Africa and Latin America seem increasingly irrelevant continents in world trade in 
money terms (non-essential continents?), while in material terms their share of 
exports (and ecological rucksacks) is increasing.  The United States now imports 
almost half of the increasing amount of oil it consumes. Second, behind the 
physical realities there are social issues of pollution and environmental 
degradation, from which social movements arise. Ecologically unequal exchange is 
one main cause of the local movements and the networks around the world against 
oil and gas wells and pipelines, against eucalyptus plantations, against gold and 
copper mining, against “biopiracy”, against shrimp farming or the abuse of 
fisheries.   
 
Such movements are in the vanguard on the issue of  “corporate accountability” 
and try to bring foreign firms to court in their own countries of origin (under the 
ATCA legislation in the United Sates). Examples are Texaco in Ecuador (an oil 
company), Freeport McMoRan in West Papua (Irian Jaya, Indonesia) (a gold and 
coppper mining company), and many others. The concept of “environmental 
liabilities” arising from concrete instances of pollution in mining or oil extraction 
is significant in this respect. The CERCLA-Superfund legislation in the United 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
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States is not applicable internationally. After listing a number of cases in the 
United States in which indemnities have been paid by corporations such as the 
Exxon Valdez, a Venezuelan journalist  asked himself: “Being Venezuela a country 
dominated by the oil and mining industries, the question is, which is the pasivo 
ambiental (i.e. environmental liability) of all this oil and mining activity in our 
country?”
5  It is fascinating to watch the diffusion of the term pasivo ambiental 
(equivalent to deuda ecológica) in Latin America. 
 
 
The ecological debt 
 
In this section, the notion of the “ecological debt” will be considered. It brings 
together many international ecological distribution conflicts, and it also puts on the 
table the question of the languages in which such conflicts are represented. The 
ecological debt is in principle an economic concept. The first discussions took place 
around 1992, largely because of the inputs from Latin American NGO. Fidel 
Castro was persuaded by Latin American activists to use this concept in his own 
speech at the official conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
6 Also Virgilio Barco, the 
president of Colombia at the time, had used the expression in a speech in the 
United States at the M.I.T. commencement ceremony on 4 June 1990. Almost one 
decade later, Friends of the Earth at its general assembly of 1999 made of  the 
Ecological Debt one of its campaigns for the following years. The notion of an 
ecological debt is not particularly radical. Think of the environmental liabilities 
incurred by firms (under the United States Superfund legislation), or of the 
engineering field called “restoration ecology”, or the proposals by the Swedish 
government in the early 1990s to calculate the country’s environmental debt.
7  
 
Ecologically unequal exchange is one of the reason for the claim of the Ecological 
Debt. The second reason for this claim is the disproportionate use of 
environmental space by the rich countries. Putting both reasons together, and 




Regarding Ecologically Unequal Exchange: 
 
-  The (unpaid) costs of reproduction or maintenance or sustainable 
management of the renewable resources which have been exported. 
For instance, the nutrients in the agricultural exports of Argentina 
(Pengue, 2002). 
 
-  The actualized costs of the future lack of availability of destroyed 
natural resources. For instance, the oil and minerals no longer 
                                                           
5 Orlando Ochoa Teran, Quinto Dia, 18 January 2000, relayed by J.C.Centeno through the Environment 
in Latin America discussion list (ELAN at CSF).  
6 Personal communication from Manuel Baquedano, the head of the Instituto de Ecología Política, Chile. 
7 See www.deudaecologica.org.. For Sweden, the reports of Arne Jernelov issued by the Swedish 
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available,  the biodiversity destroyed. This is a difficult figure to 
compute, for several reasons. Figures on the reserves, estimation of 
the technological obsolence because of substitution, and a decision on 
the rate of discount are needed in the case of minerals or oil. For 
biodiversity, knowledge of what is being destroyed would be needed. 
 
-  The compensation for, or the costs of reparation (unpaid) of the local 
damages produced by exports (for example, the sulfur dioxide of 
copper smelters, the mine tailings, the harms to health from flower 
exports, the pollution of water by mining), or the actualized value of 
irreversible damage. 
 
-  The (unpaid) amount corresponding to the commercial use of 
information and knowledge on genetic resources, when they have 
been appropriated gratis (“biopiracy”). For agricultural genetic 
resources, the basis for such a claim already exists under the FAO’s 
Farmers’ Rights. 
    
Regarding lack of payment for environmental services or for the disproportionate 
use of Environmental Space: 
 
-  The (unpaid) reparation costs or compensation for the impacts 
caused by imports of solid or liquid toxic waste. 
 
-  The (unpaid) costs of free disposal of gas residues (carbon dioxide, 
CFC...), assuming equal rights to sinks and reservoirs (see below). 
 
One objection to the notion of an Ecological Debt is that debts are obligations 
arising from contracts, such as a sale or a mortgage. A non-recognised debt does 
not exist, according to this view. However, there are cases in which debts have 
arisen without a contract. Witness for instance the obligation to pay reparations by 
the German state or companies after the Second World War (with the agreement 
of most citizens of the country). Another objection to the notion of the Ecological 
Debt is that it implies monetization of Nature’s services. I confess, mea culpa. One 
excuse: the chrematistic language is well understood in the North.  
 
The idiom of Environmental Justice against “environmental racism” has been 
employed in the United States in the struggle against the disproportionate amount 
of pollution in areas occupied by minority and low income people. Anti-racism is a 
powerful language in the United States. The disproportionate emissions of carbon 
dioxide are an international example of environmental injustice. Another idiom is 
be that of Environmental Security, similarly to how we speak of food security as an 
agricultural policy which would assure local availability of food through use of 
local human and land resources. The AOSIS countries could argue that the North 
is producing a disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases which is not only 
counter to environmental justice, and it does not only give rise to environmental 
liabilities. It also puts the environmental security of the South (or at least parts of 
the South) at risk.
8  
                                                           
8 Authors who have written on environmental security include Thomas Homer-Dixon, Peter 
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Consider then the case of the environmental service provided by the permanent 
carbon sinks (oceans, new vegetation, soils), and by the atmosphere as a temporary 
reservoir where the carbon dioxide accumulates while waiting for a permanent 
sink. Thus, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased 
from 280 ppm to 360 ppm. The decision of the European Union at Kyoto in 
December 1997 was to allow the concentration to increase to 550 ppm which would 
possibly involve a two degree centigrade rise in temperature, with much 
uncertainty on the range, and even more regarding local effects. That this is a 
“safe” limit has been strongly disputed (Azar and Rhode, 1997). The emissions per 
person per year are in the United States of the order of 6 tons of carbon, in Europe 
half of this, in India 0.4 tons. We all breath in and out more or less the same, and it 
would be impracticable to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by slow respiration. 
There are livelihood emissions, and luxury emissions. We are dealing here with one 
characteristic feature of human ecology, extreme intraspecific difference in the 
exosomatic use of fuels, differences which are much larger than such national per 
capita figures reveal. The global average is about one ton of carbon per 
person/year (global emissions, 6000 M tons of carbon),  already excessive, though it 
will normally increase because of population growth and economic growth. In 
Kyoto in 1997 and afterwards, the European Union, playing the “leadership 
game”, got “grandfathered rights” in exchange for a slight reduction in emissions. 
The United States found difficult to accept any reduction (partly because 
population is growing in the U.S.) until President Bush’s final refusal of the Kyoto 
Protocol in early 2001. Kyoto gave rights to the U.S., Europe and Japan equal to 
their 1990 emissions, on the promise of a reduction of 5.2 per cent for the year 
2010. The required reduction in order to avoid further increase in concentration in 
the atmosphere, is much larger, of the order of half the present emissions, that is 
some 3000 M tons of carbon per year.  
 
There are many instances in which through a change of industrial technology, or 
through conservation of forests under threat, or through new vegetation, there is a 
genuine gain in jointly implementing the objectives of carbon emissions reduction. 
How will such gain be shared? What will be the price of reduction of carbon 
emissions, or the price of the extra absorption? When the commitment to reduce 
emissions is small, as at present, then, in principle, the price of a ton of carbon in 
joint implementation projects will be low because the demand for sinks will be 
small. The price will be low if local negative externalities from the projects 
themselves are not factored into the price. The price will also be low when the 
supply of projects in the South  (whether as additional sinks, especially when 
conservation of threatened primary forests is also accepted, or as changes in 
techniques which diminish carbon emissions such as substituting natural gas for 
coal) is large, compared to the demand. However, should the commitment to 
reduce be of the order of 3000 M tons of carbon per year, as it should be, then the 
price would increase enormously. In other words, the stronger and quicker the 
commitment to reduce, the higher the marginal cost of the reduction. Perhaps, if 
the owners of carbon sinks are poor,  the local selling price of carbon absorption 
will still be low - then intermediaries would come into play, perhaps southern 
governments, perhaps northern financial institutions. Instead, if there is not 
reduction, this implies the persistent and disproportionate use of the sinks (oceans, 
new vegetations and the soils), and the atmosphere, as de facto property of the 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
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rich, and therefore a continuous increase year after year of the ecological debt, at 
the tune, say of, US$ 60 billion per year (3000 M tons of carbon which should be 
reduced at the cost of US$ 20 per ton). The ecological debt arises on this count 
because, by not doing the necessary reduction, the rich countries save themselves a 
quantity which would be roughly of this order of magnitude. One could easily 
argue than the appropriate average cost to use should be US$ 100 per ton or even 
higher. In any case, as a term of comparison, the present accumulated Latin 
American external debt is in 1999 of US$ 700 billion (equivalent to only 12 years of 
“carbon debt” at US$ 60 billion per year). 
 
A similar calculation was published already in 1995 by Jyoti Parikh (a member of 
the IPCC), making in substance the same argument. If we take the present human-
made emisions of carbon, the average is about 1 ton per person and per year. 
Industrialized countries produce three-fourths of these emissions, instead of the 
one-fourth which would correspond to them on the basis of population. The 
difference is 50 per cent of total emissions, some 3000 M tons. Here the increasing 
marginal cost of reduction is again contemplated: the first 1000 M tons could be 
reduced at a cost of, say, US15 per ton, but then the cost increases very much. Let 
us take an average of US$25, then a total annual subsidy of US$ 75 billion is 
forthcoming from South to North (Parikh, 1995). 
 
Such calculations are now being taken up and elaborated upon by NGOs 
concerned with the social and environmental burdens imposed on poor countries 
by the service and repayment of the external debt. Thus, Christian Aid made 
available in 1999 a document on climate change, debt, equity and survival (with 
the title Who owes who?, and pictures of Bangladesh children with water up to 
their necks) that argues that to mitigate the effects of climate change “we will all 
have to live within our environmental budget. The atmosphere can only absorb a 
certain amount of greenhouse gases before disruption begins. So, their emission 
needs controlling. As, each day, industrialized countries delay action on the 60-80 
per cent cuts that are needed, they go over-budget and are running up an 
environmental or “carbon” debt. Ironically those same countries today stand in 
judgement over much poorer countries who have comparatively insignificant 
conventional, financial debts”. Christian Aid’s calculation of the “carbon debt” is 
done in this way: the carbon intensity of GNP is taken as constant, a reduction of 
carbon amissions in rich countries of 60-80 per cent is assumed, the corresponding 
decrease in GNP is calculated. The enormous decrease in GNP does not occur 
because the reduction in emissions does not take place: this is the avoided cost, i.e. 
the debt. Christian Aid’s figures are far too high because small reductions of 
carbon emissions can be achieved with small marginal costs (perhaps even with 
win-win opportunities), the marginal cost increasing with the volume and urgency 
of the reductions. One has to allow for changing in techniques and in the 
composition of output.  
 
Other Christian groups such as the Canadian Ecumenical Council for Economic 
Justice have also in 2000 estimated the “carbon debt” in the context of the 
increasing discussion on the ecological debt (www.ecej.org). There are many 
uncertainties as to how the future energy systems will develop. Methods for 
injecting the carbon dioxide into the earth or in aquifers might become practicable 
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windmills is increasing in many places. If we look at the past century, we see that 
new energy systems are added on top of the existing ones, without substituting for 
them. The world economy, and especially the rich countries’ economy, will be 
based on fossil fuels at least for thirty or forty years. Afterwards, we do not know. 
Hydrogen, to be used in fuel cells, should be seen as an energy carrier not as an 
energy source, because much energy is needed to obtain the hydrogen. Meanwhile, 
the carbon debt accumulates. 
 
To sum up, countries which are in a creditor position in the ecological debt could 
give a sense of urgency to the negotiations on climate change (and also on other 
issues, such as Farmers’ Rights), by claiming the ecological debt, which is 
admittedly hard to quantify in money terms. They could join in a grenhouse 
politics based on Contraction of emissions, Convergence to about 0.5 tons of 
carbon per capita and per year, and in the meantime Compensation, at the same 




In conclusion, a social metabolic view of the world capitalist system leads to 
doctrines of ecologically unequal trade and ecological debt. It also helps to see 
history in wider terms than merely the economic, and it might help therefore to 
change the international political agenda by giving intellectual support to the many 
resistance movements grown out of ecological distribution conflicts. Such 
“environmentalisms of the poor” (Martinez-Alier, 2002) might choose to express 
their grievances in economic language because the capitalists and their institutions 
appreciate it (i.e. the carbon debt in money terms, a chrematistically quantified 
estimation of unequal trade because of unaccounted externalities and exhaustion of 
resources,  a proposal for “natural capital depletion taxes”). They might quote 
again with reason Prebisch’s thesis. Normally however, except in contexts where 
claims for environmental liabilities are being adjudicated, they might prefer to 
argue not in the hegemonic economic language but in physical or social languages. 
Why? Because of “Lawrence Summers’ principle” - “the poor sell cheap” both in 
actual markets and in fictitious markets where willingness-to-accept compensation 
is assessed. Also, because money valuation is unable to cope convincingly with 
future damages, and with loses of biodiversity and other unkown or uncertain 
effects.  
 
Environmental movements of the poor might choose instead a Marxist economic 
language (in terms of unequal exchanges of labour). They might move outside 
economics altogether, and argue in terms of environmental justice against 
environmental racism. They could emphasize their threatened livelihoods (the 
oikonomia) and environmental security. Or they could also argue in physical 
terms, pointing at the widely different “ecological footprints” per capita, and refer 
back to “social metabolism” accounting showing trade balances so favourable to 
the North in terms of tonnage (and in terms of pollution and other “ecological 
rucksacks”), and correspondingly the uncompensated current of exergy from 
South to North. They might list other cruelties and profanations that take place in 
their countries because of international trade and capital accumulation, using 
different idioms. There are many languages of valuation. This diversity is here not 
a cause for post-modern celebration, rather we are looking again at the history of 21/2004 – UHE/UAB – 03.03.2004 
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systemic exploitation of the South by the North. Some of these languages may be 
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